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Preface
This documented briefing, prepared for the Office for Life Sciences, presents
the findings from a short study to examine international examples of
accelerating the use of drugs, devices and diagnostics.
The findings from this briefing were presented to the Office for Life Sciences
on the 13th April 2015.
This is an independent report commissioned and funded by the Policy
Research Programme in the Department of Health for the Accelerated Access
review. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Department or
the review.
Policy Research In Science and Medicine (PRISM) unit provides research-
based evidence to the UK's National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) to
support the NIHR's research strategy, Best Research for Best Health.
Alongside that PRISM aims to provide impetus to the science of science policy
field in the UK, Europe and internationally.
RAND Europe is an independent not-for-profit policy research organisation
that aims to improve policy and decision-making in the public interest through
research and analysis. This report has been peer-reviewed in accordance with
RAND’s quality assurance standards.
For more information about RAND Europe, PRISM or this document, please
contact:
Dr Steven Wooding
 
RAND Europe
 
Westbrook Centre
 
Milton Road
 
Cambridge CB4 1YG
 
United Kingdom
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wooding@rand.org3
 
   
 
    
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
                                                              
  
  
   
   
  
  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of contents
Context of the review 5
	
Key conclusions 7
	
Outline of the report 9
	
Issues for innovation in the UK health system 10
	
Interventions for accelerated access 13
	
Accelerated review 15
	
Parallel review 18
	
Verification review 20
	
Pre-approval access 22
	
Non-standard authorisation 25
	
Coverage with evidence development 28
	
Performance based reimbursement 30
	
Stakeholder engagement 33
	
Human factors approach 36
	
Wider cost-effectiveness measures 38
	
Special pricing agreements 41
	
Enabling factors 43
	
Interventions can be combined 47
	
Methodology 51
	
References 52
	
4
 
     
   
      
     
    
  
    
     
      
   
       
    
       
 
     
     
      
    
 
 
Accelerated Access Review: 
Context
In November 2014, the UK government launched the Accelerated
Access Review to assess pathways for the development, assessment,
and adoption of innovative medicines and medical technology. The
review will consider how to speed up access for NHS patients to cost-
effective new diagnostics, medicines and devices. The purpose of the 
review is to:
‘ensure that NHS patients benefit from earlier access to innovative
drugs, diagnostics and devices, and help Government lead the global 
race for life sciences investment by making the UK the best place for 
21st century medical innovation and product development’
As part of the review, a number of studies have been commissioned to
further understand systems for regulation, assessment, adoption and
reimbursement to accelerate the adoption of medical innovation in the
UK.
RAND Europe, in collaboration with the Policy Institute at King’s 
College London, was asked to support the Accelerated Access Review
by conducting a short study to examine international examples of
accelerating the use of drugs, devices and diagnostics.
5
 
     
     
     
    
   
   
     
   
  
        
 
     
   
       
   
   
 
 
 
Accelerated Access Review: 
Context
The aims of this piece of work are:
•		 To identify the key features of systems in which drugs, devices and 
diagnostics are assessed from trials to patients quickly, by considering a 
number of global ‘front-runners’;
•		 To understand how these systems work in practice;
•		 To reflect on the challenges and opportunities to effectively translate into 
the UK’s health system, bearing in mind differing characteristics and 
economic/social/ideological backgrounds as well as identifying where 
legislative changes might be required.
A second piece of work is being led by Deloitte, in partnership with the
King’s Fund and the Centre for the Advancement of Sustainable 
Medical Innovation (CASMI). It aims to map the current processes and
pathways through which innovative medicines, devices and diagnostics 
are assessed in the UK, from proof of concept through regulation, cost-
effectiveness assessment and adoption, and to identify issues, barriers 
and opportunities within the UK’s current approach.
6
 
      
 
      
  
    
        
     
     
       
     
    
     
      
  
         
      
    
     
       
 
   
         
    
    
     
      
     
      
 
Key conclusions 
Comparable empirical data are not strong enough to identify across-the-
board international ‘front-runners’
Studies have found that adoption rates vary among therapeutic areas and
between countries. This suggests that studies in specific therapeutic areas 
cannot be generalised to other areas. Further, studies often compare level of
use rather than rate of appropriate adoption, and they frequently focus on
different sections of the pathway. Where these studies attempt to explain
differences in use or adoption they often identify cultural or structural features 
of the health system as being important.
The UK system performs well in some comparisons and most of the
international examples of interventions have UK parallels
Many interviewees felt that the NHS can be an exemplar of adoption for cost-
effective innovation, but this is not a solved problem in any health system. It
was striking that most international examples of interventions have UK 
equivalents. This commonality of approach is likely to be a consequence of
international interactions and the significant role played by the National Institute
for Clinical Excellence (NICE) and the Medicines and Healthcare Products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in EU-wide programmes, such as the Adaptive 
Pathways pilot of the European Medicines Agency (EMA). 
The approaches identified can be split into four conceptual groups each 
with different repercussions on the stakeholders in the health system
We identified 11 key interventions that speed up the adoption of medical 
innovation. We categorised them into four conceptual approaches: process 
improvement, risk sharing, process linkage, and addressing market
failure/pricing. We discuss each intervention in turn, highlighting the countries 
which have adopted it, how the intervention works in theory and in practice, its 
strengths and weaknesses and the evidence for its effectiveness. We also 
discuss observations on these interventions’ applicability to the UK.
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Key conclusions
The terminology used to describe interventions to speed up adoption is
inconsistent 
For example, mechanisms where the level of evidence required for regulatory
approval is lowered are variously referred to as ‘early access’, ‘expanded
access’, ‘compassionate use’, ‘named-patient schemes’ and/or ‘pre-approval 
access’. In addition, mechanisms that are conceptually different are often
pursued in tandem, which makes considering the repercussions of
interventions or comparing them across different systems more challenging. 
Three underlying capabilities of the health system can support 
interventions to speed up adoption 
The key capabilities identified by our interviewees and literature review are 
effective clinical trial infrastructure, an efficient data infrastructure and
systems to help generate evidence and a clinical culture which champions 
new medical innovations. 
A systems approach to speeding up the adoption of medical innovation 
will be necessary
Given the particular features of the NHS, as well as the UK parallels for many
of the international examples, there are unlikely to be ‘silver bullets’, that will 
transform adoption in the NHS. Rather our examples will provide insights into
the important concepts and interventions that will help support a systems 
approach to improvement.
Two interventions stood out for their novelty in relation to the UK system and 
for their potentially transformative nature. First, the Prescription Drug Act of
1992 provided more resources to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), and it set targets that significantly reduced review times. Second, the
use of abbreviated review processes for medicines, devices or diagnostics 
that have been approved in other jurisdictions could allow the for focusing of
resources on those medicines, devices and diagnostics that are of most value 
to the domestic health system.
8
 
         
    
        
      
       
  
       
    
  
    
       
   
     
 
Outline of the report
The first section of this briefing provides a brief overview of the key
issues for innovation in the UK health system.
We then discuss each of the 11 interventions in detail, assessing the
evidence base of the examples identified, examining the strengths 
and weaknesses of each approach and considering their applicability
for the UK system.
We also identify three enabling factors that can underpin and
strengthen these interventions: clinical trial infrastructure, data
systems, and clinical culture.
Finally, we present some interesting examples of instances where 
the interventions identified have been combined, either in the case of
a particular disease (Ebola) or under a particular concept (Value-
based Pricing & Adaptive Pathways pilot).
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Overview of the UK health innovation system
	
Before we consider approaches in detail, we feel it is helpful to present some of the key characteristics of the UK health
innovation system.
•		 Innovation, adoption and diffusion are complex issues – Medical innovation is an inherently multifaceted issue, 
and the factors that affect how innovations are diffused, disseminated and implemented are complex (Greenhalgh et 
al. 2005). Social structures and norms, individual and institutional contexts – as well as specific features of an
innovation – have all been considered as key factors influencing the adoption and diffusion of medical innovations 
(Rogers 2003; Greenhalgh et al. 2005; Consoli & Mina 2009).
•		 There are inevitable tensions in the UK health innovation system –
There are also inevitable tensions in the UK health innovation system which 
impact on the adoption of new medicines and medical technologies. First, the re
is tension among the interests, needs and concerns of key stakeholder group s 
in the health system. Patients and patient groups want the best health and
demand earlier access to potentially life-saving medical innovations. Industry
requires favourable regulatory and environmental conditions for stimulating
innovation and ultimately needs a commercial return. The NHS must balance
these tensions, within its own resource constraints, ensuring that the health o f
the population is maximised. Second, there is an inherent tension in the
need to balance fast access to new medical innovations for patients and
the need to ensure that comprehensive evidence is collected on the safety, 
efficacy and cost-effectiveness of these technologies.
•		 Medical devices and diagnostics have a separate set of issues 
to medicines – It is also important to note that categories of medical 
innovation, such as drugs, diagnostics and medical devices, each have a
separate set of issues and that they therefore should be treated differently when we discuss 
adoption and diffusion. It was apparent from both the interviews and the literature review that evidence on the
adoption of medical devices and diagnostics is limited compared with that available in relation to medicines. Where
possible we have highlighted in our international examples how each intervention relates to each category of
medical innovation. 
10
     
       
    
     
      
          
          
       
       
        
  
         
      
        
   
         
 
   
          
       
  
 
             
      
       
          
        
  
 
Lack of comparable data on appropriate adoption
An important issue in the assessment of mechanisms that speed up the adoption of medical innovations is the lack 
of comparative empirical data on international adoption rates of medical innovations. Studies comparing various 
aspects of adoption are limited for a variety of reasons, including:
•		 They focus only on particular sections of the pathway (e.g. time for 
regulatory approval);
•		 They measure the level of adoption rather than the rate of adoption;
•		 They lack measures for the appropriateness of adoption (e.g. are higher levels
of usage desirable?);
•		 They focus specifically on a particular disease or innovation type
(e.g. drugs, devices).
For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) (2011) surveyed 50 life sciences 
companies developing drugs, diagnostics and devices on the ease of regulatory
approval processes versus the regulatory approval time for several OECD
countries as part of their Medical Technology Innovation Scorecard. The UK was 
considered to have a shorter and easier approval process than the U.S., but it 
was considered slower than France and Germany. Source: PWC Innovation scorecard (2011)
There is no consistent message on which countries are the ‘front-runners’ and where the UK is relative to others. For 
example, while some studies note that contrary to the PWC report the UK is slow to approve new drugs 
(GlaxoSmithKline 2011), others suggest that the UK (and/or EU) performs better than the U.S. (Boston Consulting
Group 2012). 
With regards to the 2012 European Commission Transparency Directive that targets a ‘time to access’ of 120 days for 
reimbursement decisions, only Germany and the UK are currently compliant (Flostrand 2014). Interviewees noted that 
many of the international differences in adoption rates are driven by country-specific factors, which are often difficult to
change. This finding was also reflected in the literature; for example, Brekke et al.’s (2013) study of the diffusion of anti-
TNF drugs across Europe found that ‘large parts of the cross-country variation are explained by time-invariant country-
specific factors (e.g. disease prevalence, demographics, health care system)’. 
11
   
      
        
            
          
    
     
   
          
      
   
       
       
      
          
       
   
 
New healthcare innovations follow a pathway
	
Safety Effectiveness Cost-effectiveness
	
Innovation is not a linear process. Development and adoption processes can occur in parallel and inform each other. 
Nevertheless, while the development of a medical innovation is not linear, the pathway of adoption in healthcare
often follows a common set of stages. Although the pathway depicted in the figure above, is a simplified version of
the route to adoption for drugs, devices and diagnostics, it provides an overview of the gateways for evidence
assessment on safety, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness that are needed for medical innovations.
The pathway from development to adoption, implementation and diffusion into clinical practice also involves a
number of key stakeholders including researchers, industry, regulators, payers, health service providers, clinicians 
and patients. Interventions to accelerate adoption can occur at any stage of this pathway and often involve a number of
stakeholder groups. Underpinning these interventions are a series of enabling factors which provide a conducive
environment for them to work.
For the purpose of this review we consider the adoption of innovative medicines and medical technologies
from proof-of-concept to practice. Although interventions aimed at stimulating basic research are equally crucial to
effective medical innovation, they are outside the scope of this study. 
We also observed a lack of international examples on interventions at the implementation stage of the pathway, 
although we recognise that these may be crucial in accelerating adoption. 
12
 
   
    
      
 
       
     
  
 
  
    
   
 
 
      
      
 
   
   
  
 
Interventions for accelerated 
pathways
Our findings suggest there are a number of different examples of
interventions, which can occur at each stage of the pathway. We 
have grouped these interventions into four overarching categories:
•		 Process improvement
Interventions that aim to shorten one stage of the process through
providing additional resources, focusing resources, pooling
resources across countries or conducting the processes in 
parallel.
•		 Risk sharing
Interventions that blur the decision points among stages by
spreading risk across different stakeholders; for example, allowing
early access to drugs still under review. 
•		 Process linkage
Interventions that aimed to align the expectations and priorities of
stakeholders along the pathway to reduce duplication of effort.
•		 Addressing market failure/pricing
Interventions that aim to address market failures or pricing
barriers, such as widening cost-effectiveness measures or using
non–outcome-based reimbursement mechanisms.
13
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Process improvement:
	
Accelerated review
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
The term accelerated review refers to mechanisms intended to lead to faster market authorisation, where regulators offer more 
resources, greater engagement, or faster/rolling reviews of medical innovations
International examples
In the U.S., the FDA currently offers three mechanisms to accelerate and facilitate the regulatory approval of new drugs 
through provision of greater resources and/or prioritisation of review applications (Fast Track designation,
Breakthrough Therapy designation and Priority Review pathway). Each mechanism is distinct from the other ones 
and is intended for use in slightly different contexts. Fast Track, and to an even greater extent Breakthrough Therapy,
offers earlier and more intense engagement with regulators. By contrast, Priority Review reduces the processing time 
of a new drug application from the standard 10 months to 6 months. 
With respect to resourcing regulators, one option is to charge applicants for the provision of regulatory services. For
instance, Darrow et al. (2014) credit the 1992 Prescription Drug User Fee Act, which allowed the FDA to collect fees 
from drug producers, with helping expedite the US review process.
Under the EMA’s Accelerated Assessment (equivalent to the FDA’s Priority Review), the standard limit of 210 days for 
approval is reduced to 150 days. The authorization application needs to pertain to a product that is [of major interest 
from the point of view of public health and in particular from the viewpoint of therapeutic innovation’.
	
Japan’s Sakigake designation, provided by the Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare (PMDA) aims at accelerating
adoption of Japanese-made innovative pharmaceutical products, medical devices, and regenerative medicines. Its 
benefits are similar to those offered under the FDA’s mechanisms in that Sakigake offers increased and early
consultation with regulatory authorities and prioritisation of the approval application review.
15
 
 
     
 
 
     
  
 
 
   
   
   
    
 
   
 
  
 
 
  
  
   
   
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
 
  
   
 
 
   
 
 
  
      
 
 
  
 
   
  
  
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
Process improvement:
Accelerated review
Comparison of accelerated review programmes
Mechanism Eligibility Benefits Evidence requirements
•		 Serious conditionFast Track 
•		 Unmet medical need(FDA)
Breakthrough
	
Therapy (FDA)
	
•		 Serious condition
•		 Preliminary evidence of
improvement over existing therapy
•		 More frequent engagement with 
FDA
•		 Eligibility for Accelerated Approval
and Priority Review pathways
•		 Rolling review of applications
• All Fast Track benefits
•		 Early FDA guidance
• Senior FDA involvement
•		 Standard unless participating in 
Accelerated Approval (see below
on non-standard authorisation)
•		 Eligibility: Effect on clinically
significant endpoint
•		 Market authorization: Standard 
unless participating in Accelerated
Approval
•		 Potential for significant •		 Faster review of new drug Priority Review •		 Standard unless participating in 
improvement over existing therapy application(FDA) Accelerated Approval (see below
on non-standard authorisation)
•		 Of major interest to public health •		 Faster review of new drug Accelerated •		 Standard
applicationAssessment (EMA)
•		 ‘Dire need of therapy’ •		 Early consultation and designated Sakigake •		 Standard
•		 Improvement over existing therapy senior support(PMDA)
(based on Phase I, II data) •		 Pre-application consultation
•		 Developed in Japan Priority Review
•		 Extension of post–market 
verification period
16
 
 
  
    
 
   
     
     
    
     
  
       
    
    
   
     
 
    
   
    
     
  
     
  
      
    
      
    
   
     
   
      
 
 
  
  
        
   
  
  
     
   
   
     
   
   
    
    
   
    
 
 
   
   
   
     
    
  
 
Process improvement:
	
Accelerated review
Strengths and weaknesses
Fast track designation and other similar mechanisms that involve early
and intensive collaboration among drug developers and regulatory
agencies are very resource-demanding. Any potential benefits 
stemming from fast track mechanisms can be reaped only if the 
regulatory body in question has the resources necessary to carry out
expedited reviews. Therefore, any trends and differences in review
times need to be seen at least partially as a function of available 
resources.
Mechanisms are not necessarily mutually exclusive. For instance, by
earning the Fast Track or Breakthrough Therapy designation, a drug is 
eligible for the Priority Review pathway. In addition, these mechanisms 
can be used in conjunction with programmes that may authorise the 
marketing of a medicinal product based on a lower evidentiary
standard.
Similarly, early engagement among regulators and industry is 
dependent on the drug developers’ willingness to enter into such a 
relationship. One interviewee observed that this is far from automatic 
because product developers may fear that early collaboration with 
regulators may lead to an increased workload and thus additional
costs. As a recent PWC report observed (2015), this may be 
particularly applicable to smaller companies with limited resources.
There is evidence that setting tight deadlines for regulatory review may
be associated with increases in clinical safety issues post market
authorisation (Carpenter et al. 2008, 2012). However, it should be 
noted that this evidence pertains to drug review in general, rather than 
review under one of the accelerated mechanisms. Where there is 
literature on the effect of faster reviews, it also points tentatively in the 
direction of increased post–marketing adverse effects (Olson, 2013).
However, such findings remain controversial (Darrow et al. 2014).
What is the evidence?
Schulman and Brown (1995) compared the length of the 
regulatory phase of Subpart-E (an early form of the Fast
Track pathway) drugs approved between 1998 and1993 with 
a comparison group of similarly rated non–fast-tracked drugs 
approved during the same period and found that the fast-
tracked regulatory phase (i.e. IND submission to NDA
approval) was on average 3.3 years shorter.
The effects of individual accelerating mechanisms can be 
further magnified by their combined use.
The impact of accelerated review pathways can also be 
indirectly inferred from drug manufacturers’ willingness to 
purchase FDA’s Priority Review Vouchers (PRV) in order to 
ensure a speedier processing of their new drug applications.
For instance, in November 2014, Gilead Sciences paid $125
million to buy a PRV from Knight Therapeutics (MarketWired 
2014).
Applicability to the UK
In the UK, the MHRA Innovation office can provide early
advice to drug and device manufacturers, though it falls short
of a clear fast track designation. It also entails a ‘Promising 
Innovative Medicine’ designation, which may be somewhat
akin to the FDA’s breakthrough therapy one.
17
   
 
     
         
   
        
 
 
 
          
        
       
          
           
        
         
         
             
         
           
            
           
       
           
           
   
 
 
 
 
 
Process improvement: 

Parallel review
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
Parallel review involves a medical product going through processes of market authorisation (i.e. regulatory review) at the same time 
as aspects of cost-effectiveness and coverage for reimbursement are decided (i.e. pharmacoeconomic review).
It focuses on aligning timeframes and logistical aspects of the review processes to improve efficiency.
International examples
In 2008, Canada ran a pilot programme of parallel review as a collaboration among its regulatory and HTA bodies: 
Health Canada and the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Technologies in Health (CADTH), respectively. Parallel review
was initiated for breakthrough drugs: i.e. immediately life-threatening diseases or drugs that could save at least $2.5m 
to reimbursement recommendations under Canada’s Common Drug Review (CDR) programme. The pilot was further
extended to oncology drugs. As of November 2012 CADTH announced that all new drugs would go through parallel
review as part of a revised CDR process.
Regulatory review is carried out in Australia by the Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), with recommendations on
pricing being made via the Pharmaceutical Benefits Advisory Committee (PBAC). Both agencies are involved in 
providing non-binding advice to industry in the design of Phase III trials, as well as the preparation of manufacturers’
dossiers for review. Parallel review has been available in Australia since January 2011. Applications for reimbursement
can be submitted at any time following registration, but as the timelines for PBAC (~4 months) are shorter than TGA
(~9 months), decisions on reimbursement are not released publically until after the TGA has reached its decision.
The US is currently undertaking an extended pilot programme (initiated in 2011) for parallel review of medical devices, 
due to complete end 2015. This programme offers concurrent marketing approval (via the FDA) and coverage 
determination (via the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)) of up to five devices p/a that meet one of a 
number of criteria, including class III (i.e. high-risk) medical devices that require pre-market approval (PMA)
submissions to the FDA.
18
    
 
  
      
      
      
      
     
      
        
    
   
  
        
     
   
    
     
   
     
      
       
   
   
 
  
    
  
    
    
   
    
   
     
      
 
     
   
  
 
 
   
     
     
   
   
    
    
    
 
Process improvement:
	
Parallel review
Strengths and weaknesses
The Canadian approach involved a trial of new methods to share 
information among regulatory and HTA authorities. Since parallel
review was initiated for all new drugs as part of Canada’s Common
Drug Review (CDR) process in 2012, there is no longer a need for 
a standalone priority (i.e. accelerated) review process – as the
backlog of all CDR applications had been cleared. This would 
suggest that parallel review can be successfully implemented given
sufficient resources and appropriate sharing of information.
Nevertheless, caution must be exercised when basing
reimbursement decisions on pharmacoeconomic analyses 
submitted by manufacturers. Yong et al. (2013) found up to one 
third of such submissions had significant problems that could distort
the results and hinder recommendation committees in their
assessment of cost-effectiveness. They recommended improving
simple sensitivity analyses around key variables and following best
practice guidelines for reporting economic evaluations.
While no studies could be found to highlight the effectiveness of the
US parallel review programme, Rome et al. (2014) highlight a 
number of issues arising from the pre-marketing approval process 
as it relates to cardiac devices (discussed as part of Coverage with 
Evidence Development section, below).
What is the evidence?
Different agencies’ strategies in dealing with clinical
uncertainty and unfavourable cost-effectiveness can lead 
to different recommendation decisions for the same drugs.
Chabot and Rocchi (2014) describes a relationship among
the pressures of negotiating solutions to improve 
incremental cost-effectiveness ratios, and the outcome of
HTA recommendations, when looking at cancer drugs 
approved in Canada vs. the UK.
While evidence is limited on the impact of parallel review
mechanisms, studies highlight as a particular challenge 
the influence that manufacturers exert over the
submission of cost-effectiveness data, and the limitations 
of state regulators to mandate post-marketing surveillance 
and comparative effectiveness research.
Applicability to the UK
Chabot and Rocchi (2014) found that there was a 
tendency for the UK to favour risk-sharing agreements 
and price negotiations with manufacturers during HTA
review to meet a defined incremental cost-effectiveness 
ratio, resulting in approval of fewer cancer drugs when 
compared to Canada, who favoured pressure by provincial
payers to negotiate prices with manufacturers post-
approval, and as a result approved more drugs.
19
    
 
     
          
 
       
 
           
         
          
     
    
     
       
    
         
      
 
       
       
    
          
     
 
 
 
 
 
Process improvement:
	
Verification review
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
‘Verification review’ involves guaranteeing a faster regulatory review based on approvals by at least two international benchmark 
reference agencies. 
Harmonisation and international benchmarking of regulatory processes may allow cost/resource savings.
International examples
The process was introduced in Singapore in 2003. The review guarantees regulatory review within 60 days (as
opposed to 270 days) and requires a verification dossier to be submitted within three years from the date of approval
by the chosen primary reference agency. Currently, Singapore uses the following reference agencies for review:
• Australia Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA)  European Medicines Agency (Centralised Procedure)
• Health Canada  UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
• FDA Agency (MHRA)
In Singapore, an ‘Abridged review’ is also offered which only requires one reference agency’s approval and guarantees 
the review in 180 days. 
New Zealand pursues an abbreviated evaluation process for certain drugs that have already been approved by a 
trusted overseas regulatory authority. Drugs also have to have been approved within the last five years.
For medical devices, the Medical Device Single Audit Program (MDSAP) have recently
launched a pilot among the US, Canada, Australia, Japan and Brazil to harmonise regulatory
requirements for medical products. The pilot allows authorised organisations to ‘conduct a 
single audit of a medical device manufacturer that will satisfy the relevant requirements of the
medical device regulatory authorities participating in the pilot program’.
20
    
 
  
    
 
         
   
        
      
      
     
 
   
    
  
    
    
      
       
 
  
      
   
 
   
  
     
  
     
     
 
   
        
      
    
 
        
   
 
    
      
    
     
   
 
 
Process improvement:
	
Verification review
Strengths and weaknesses
This process has the potential to save costs & duplication of
resources across countries. 
While this may not be an option for all applications, it may be a 
more feasible option for less complex dossiers.
However, the process may raise issues of liability if the decision to 
register medicines was based on an assessment by an overseas 
regulator and strict criteria would need to be developed to ensure 
that assessments are being conducted with consistent quality
standards.
There may also be occasions where there is disagreement among
trusted regulatory organisations on whether a medicine is 
appropriate for certain indications while another trusted regulator
rejects the medicine for the same indications.
This scheme would limit a country’s ability to be a ‘front-runner’ in 
adopting new medical innovations as it would depend on medicines 
having already been through at least one other regulatory process.
What is the evidence?
To our knowledge there has not been any evaluation of
the ‘verification review’ system in Singapore or New
Zealand.
Nevertheless, a number of countries have begun
considering abridged and verification reviews for 
medicines. For example, in a recent review of their
regulatory systems for pharmaceuticals, Australia is 
considering developing a set of transparent criteria to 
assess whether ‘trusted’ overseas regulators can be used.
Applicability to the UK
If the UK were to adopt a verification review based on an
assessment by an overseas regulator a strict criteria for 
‘trusted’ regulators would need to be established.
In addition, the UK may be limited to products outside the
scope of the EMA.
For devices there has been a ‘mutual recognition
agreement’ between the U.S. and Europe since 1998,
although the agreement does not harmonize the
legislative requirements and neither the CE mark nor an 
FDA-approved device has official status in either
respective region.
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Risk sharing:
Pre-approval access
	
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
These mechanisms and programmes allow patients to access drugs and other medicinal products that have otherwise not been
authorised for wider marketing, irrespective of whether such authorisation is planned or not). They are typically applied in instances 
of seriously ill patients or where all other treatment efforts have failed. They are therefore sometimes referred to as ‘compassionate 
use’ policies and programmes. They speed up the adoption of new products by a very narrow group of people since these patients 
can access medicinal products without the need to wait for regulatory review and approval.
International examples
Expanded Access. Under certain circumstances, the FDA allows individual patients to access drugs that have not yet 
been authorized for marketing, i.e. are still being investigated. Eligibility is restricted to serious or life-threatening
conditions with no existing comparable therapy and, in addition, the potential benefits need to be deemed to outweigh 
the costs and an individual’s participation in the scheme must not undermine any ongoing or any future clinical trials 
(FDA 2014). Once eligible, however, applicants are rarely rejected by the FDA (Gaffney 2014).
Similarly, concerning medical devices, a Humanitarian Device Exemption (HDE) may be granted for items treating or 
diagnosing a condition that affects a small number of people and, as such, its development costs would exceed its 
market returns. Under an HDE, an application is not required to provide evidence of the device’s effectiveness but a 
positive balance among its probable benefits and possible risks of injury or illness from its use needs to be
demonstrated (FDA 2014b).
The TGA in Australia also maintains three schemes that are intended to allow patients access to unauthorized
therapeutic goods under exceptional circumstances. These are Authorised Prescribers (intended for medical
practitioners who would prescribe a product unapproved by the TGA), Special Access Scheme (for patients to access 
unapproved products on a case-by-case basis), and Personal Import Scheme (for individuals to import unapproved
products for their personal use) (Department of Health Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) 2014).
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Risk sharing:
Pre-approval access
	
International examples (contd.)
In France, the Temporary Authorisation for Use (ATU) system, which was set up in 1992, allows patients to access 
medicines that do not have any marketing authorization, provided that they are intended for the treatment of serious or 
orphan diseases and there is an absence of alternative appropriate treatment. Treatments can be administered on
either a ‘named patient ATU’ or ‘cohort ATU’ basis, which makes in unique in that the ATU is one of the few European 
early access programmes to allow cohorts of patients (Degrassat-Théas et al. 2013).
Hospital pharmacies are responsible for administering ATUs to patients, and negotiate directly with pharmaceutical
companies to determine the price. The cost of the ATU is then fully reimbursed by the National Health Insurance
(NHI).
In addition to the ATU system, off-label use prescription is also authorised, known as a Recommendation of Temporary
Use (RTU) in the absence of an ATU or market authorisation. The scheme allows the monitoring of off-label prescribed 
medicines, provided that there are no alternative therapies and that the evidence base on effectiveness and safety is 
presumed to be favourable. Products are authorised by the French National Agency for Medicines and Health Products 
Safety (ANSM) and should not exceed use for over 3 years.
Degrassat-Théas et al. (2013) note that while patients receive treatments earlier under this scheme, the impact of the
programme on the market access of these drugs for the wider population, is often an increase approval times.
Japan’s Sakigake Designation includes a ‘scheme for rapid authorization of unapproved drugs’. It is intended to 
accelerate the use of unapproved drugs for serious and life-threatening diseases. Under this scheme, patients are 
allowed earlier access to drugs that have not been yet approved in Japan, although products’ eligibility for inclusion in 
this scheme is comparatively limited. Also, in contrast with the schemes discussed above, one of the explicit aims of
this programme is to facilitate the eventual approval of the product in question and data collected through this scheme
are intended to be used as part of the final approval application (Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare 2014).
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Risk sharing:
Pre-approval access
	
Strengths and weaknesses
Expanded/pre-approval access schemes are frequently surrounded by
controversy. The pharmaceutical industry is not always favourably disposed
towards them for several supply-side reasons. First, there may be a limited
supply of experimental drugs and drug manufacturers might wish to
preserve available supplies for ongoing or planned trials (Kesselheim et al.
2014). Similarly, the Expanded Access Programme places administrative
burden and other costs on drug manufacturers, who may prefer to divert
those resources the conduct of clinical trials (Darrow et al. 2015).
In this context, it is very difficult for drug manufacturers to recover the
costs stemming from their participation in the scheme. FDA sets a
ceiling on the prices of experimental drugs, which is invariably lower 
than the eventual post-market price, and, perhaps more importantly, it is
problematic for drug manufacturers to charge for their products. This is
due to risks of bad publicity and because the experimental drugs are
unlikely to be covered by insurers, including public programmes such as
Medicare (Kesselheim et al. 2014).
In addition, there are legal issues with FDA’s Expanded Access. As
currently designed, an application must be filed by the drug manufacturer,
patients (and less frequently their physicians) can only informally petition the
industry for access to experimental drugs. Courts have been asked to weigh
in on the issue whether seriously ill individuals are entitled to access to
experimental drugs and, along similar lines, several U.S. states have
passed ‘right-to-try’ laws to achieve a similar effect. However, courts have
found no such right of terminally ill patients and ‘right-to-try’ state laws can
have only very limited impact since they cannot alter existing federal
regulations (PWC 2015; Darrow et al. 2015).
Finally, there are also ethical issues to consider with respect to pre-approval
access schemes. On one hand, an argument can be made that it would be
unethical to deny terminally ill people access to potentially effective drugs.
On the other hand, it is questionable to what extent fully informed consent is
achievable, given poor levels of risk and health information comprehension
among general public (Institute of Medicine of the National Academies
2004).
What is the evidence?
There are several ways to consider the effectiveness of pre-approval schemes.
From a strictly procedural point of view, the FDA’s Expanded Access Program is
effective in that virtually all applications, regardless of their category, are accepted
by the FDA and therefore patients seen in need are provided with the product in
question (Silverman 2014).
However, the effectiveness of the medicinal product itself is far less likely. In fact,
some authors point out that the probability of an effective therapy in this experimental
setting can be as low as 10% or less (Darrow et al. 2015; Horstmann et al. 2005).
From the perspective of speeding adoption, pre-approval schemes shorten the time
needed for new products to be available for eligible participants. While the extent of
this acceleration varies substantially across individual products and depends on the
stage at which early access is requested, it is worth recalling that the estimated
average length of the drug development process from discovery to marketing
approval exceeds 10 years (DiMasi and Grabowski 2012).
However, this faster adoption serves only a very narrow group of people and it is
unclear what the scheme’s impact on the wider approval process is. One of the
reasons why industry is often reluctant to engage in the Expanded Access programme
are concerns that the regulatory review may be negatively impacted. Beneficiaries of
the programme tend to be more seriously ill than other trial participants, which may
jeopardise the final approval or lead to additional labelling requirements (Darrow et al.
2015).
Applicability to the UK
The UK has an equivalent in the early access to medicines scheme (EAMS). Under
this scheme, patients with ‘life threatening or debilitating’ conditions may be given
access to an unapproved drug, pending MHRA’s opinion on the balance of its benefits
and risks. A condition of eligibility for the EMAS scheme is that the product in question
receives a ‘Promising Innovative Medicine’ designation by the MHRA (MHRA 2014).
However, there is some uncertainty about how the EAM
S scheme fits in with existing EMA frameworks, particularly its adaptive licensing
programme (ABPI 2014).
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Risk sharing:
Non-standard authorisation
	
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
The mechanisms described below can speed up adoptions by relaxing or modifying evidentiary standard required for marketing
authorisation of a new product. This applies in situations where meeting standard level of evidence would either protract the
regulatory review or would not be feasible either for ethical or practical reasons. Often, the use of these mechanisms is conditional
on continuing with evidence collection once a product has been marketed. In contrast with accelerated review, these mechanisms 
do not alter the processing time of an authorisation application, they alter the degree of evidence required for this authorisation.
International examples
Under the Accelerated Approval pathway a drug can be approved if it has an effect on a surrogate (e.g. marker 
considered ‘reasonably likely to predict final clinical benefit’) or an intermediate clinical endpoint. If an accelerated
approval is granted, the drug developer has a subsequent requirement to verify the drug’s clinical benefit in Phase IV
confirmatory trials.
FDA is currently proposing to establish a similar mechanism for medical devices – Expedited Access for Premarket
Approval – which would combine elements of Fast Track programmes and the Accelerated Approval pathway
described above. The proposed EAP is a voluntary programme designed for medical devices that ‘demonstrate the
potential to address unmet medical needs for life threatening or irreversibly debilitating diseases or conditions’.
Participation in EAP would be voluntary and offer earlier and more intensive engagement with the FDA. In addition,
evidence requirements under EAP may include intermediate and surrogate endpoints, two-phase studies or in-vitro 
studies. 
FDA also uses the ‘Animal Efficacy Rule’ to give approval to products for ‘serious or life-threatening conditions 
caused by exposure to lethal or permanently disabling toxic biological, chemical, radiological, or nuclear substances’.
Under this rule, new products can be approved based on safety studies in humans and effectiveness studies in 
animals. The reason for waiving the requirement for efficacy testing in humans is that this would be either unethical or 
infeasible as the rule is intended to cover very rare situations.
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Risk sharing:
Non-standard authorisation
	
International examples (contd.)
	
EMA’s Conditional Marketing Authorisation is similar to the FDA’s Accelerated Approval Pathway in that it accepts 
lower level of evidence in return for further post-market requirements. However, the conditional authorization is valid for 
one year and is renewable annually, providing the specific obligations for the approved product are met and 
benefit/risk balance remains positive. It is also not based on any surrogate endpoint likely to predict final benefit but
on the likelihood of data completion post-authorisation.
In situations in which the product developer is unable to provide comprehensive clinical evidence due to practical or 
ethical reasons, such as rarity of the disease or insufficient existing scientific knowledge to collect robust data, EMA
may grant Marketing Authorisation under Exceptional Circumstances. It is not expected that such data collection 
will be possible in the future and therefore an Marketing Authorisation under Exceptional Circumstances will typically
not be converted into a ‘traditional’ authorization. This authorisation is valid for 5 years and is renewable.
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Risk sharing:
Non-standard authorisation
	
Strengths and weaknesses
All the mechanisms described in this section accept a lower 
level of evidence for market authorisation, often under the 
condition of further confirmatory post-market studies.
However, issues may arise when these are not conducted in 
a timely manner and available evidence suggests that this is 
the case with a considerable share of products approved 
conditionally. For instance, a review of cancer drugs 
approved via FDA’s Accelerated Approval among 1992 and 
2010 (Johnson et al. 2011) found that out of 47 included
items, 14 had not been subject to trials by the time the 
review was conducted.
FDA’s Animal Rule and EMA’s Authorisation under
Exceptional circumstances are intended to cover very
unusual situations (the Animal Rule was enacted by the 
Congress in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and with 
bioterrorism concerns high on the policy agenda) (Snoy
2010). As such, the number of products marketed under
these mechanisms remains very limited – for instance, the 
first product licensed under the Animal Rule, a drug against
plague, was not approved until 2012 (Gaffney 2014a).
The two mechanisms described above may also be suitable 
as response mechanisms to sudden outbreaks of serious 
diseases. For instance, the FDA Animal Rule is widely
regarded as an instrument that will be applied in an eventual
approval of a drug against Ebola (Gaffney 2014b). In the 
context of Ebola, it is worth noting pre-approval schemes,
such as ‘compassionate use’ mechanisms, have also been
used to accelerate patients’ access to drugs (FDA 2015).
What is the evidence?
Johnson et al. (2011) assessed the effect of accelerated approval on 
the availability of oncology drugs in the US. The authors found that the 
average time between accelerated approval and its conversion to 
regular approval based on confirmatory post-market trials was 4.7 
years (median 3.9 years). This represents a substantial improvement
in the availability of medicinal products to patients, though it is unclear 
whether drug producers sustain their work tempo after a marketing 
approval is granted. In other words, data are not available on how fast
a regular approval would have been achieved in the absence of the 
accelerated approval pathway.
Shulman and Brown (1995) found that applying the accelerated 
pathway to fast-tracked drugs shaved approximately 1.5 years off the 
duration of their regulatory approval phase.
With respect to the FDA’s ‘Animal Rule’, it is important to keep in mind 
that acceleration of adoption is not its primary objective, even though 
it can be combined with the Accelerated Approval pathway. On its 
own, the length of the approval process under the ‘Animal Rule’ may
even exceed that of a regular review (Estep 2009).
Applicability to the UK
There is no UK equivalent of market authorisation mechanisms that
would incorporate the element of relaxed or modified evidentiary
requirements, although the UK is included in the EMA schemes on 
Conditional Market Authorisation.
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Risk sharing: Coverage with 
evidence development
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
Coverage with evidence development (CED) refers to schemes that enable temporary funding of innovative medical products, so 
long as additional evidence of their effectiveness in wider populations is generated to address the uncertainties surrounding
reimbursement and secure ongoing coverage (Hutton et al. 2007).
It allows healthcare decisionmakers to make available a medical product in a controlled manner while also defining what evidence is 
required to support further diffusion of the technology.
International examples
CMS’s Coverage with Study Participation (CSP) programme focuses on providing reliable evidence of benefits and 
risks in a wider population so long as items or services are furnished in the context of approved clinical studies or with 
the collection of additional clinical data.
The Australian scheme for managed/shared risk in pricing (the ‘Managed Entry Scheme’) was launched in 2011. This 
was based on listing of medicines by PBAC at a price justified by the levels of existing evidence, and pending
availability of more conclusive evidence of cost-effectiveness (Wonder et al. 2012). By February 2013, 17 special
pricing arrangements were in place (Vitry & Roughead 2014) under this scheme.
The French Ministry of Health (not manufacturers) initiates CED processes, having first defined the numbers of
patients to be involved, conditions of use, funding period, and which hospitals lead the study (Martelli & van den 
Brink2014). Additional payment for in-hospital devices is only applicable to implantable devices and to those included
on the list of products and services qualifying for reimbursement (LPPR). To apply for reimbursement, manufactures 
must apply to the National Committee of Medical Devices and Health Technologies (CNEDIMTS) for assessment.
Recognising the need for a mechanism allowing innovation within the German diagnosis-related group (G-DRG)
system, the Institute for the Hospital Remuneration System (InEK) created an ‘top-up’ funding process for innovative 
products. Approved applications are subsequently monitored by InEK to ensure the technology is being used 
adequately and is cost-effective. While the system may accelerate innovation, it requires significant effort from users.
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Risk sharing: Coverage with 
Evidence Development
Strengths and weaknesses
CED can enable more patients to receive treatment
– but with the challenge that this requires careful
patient selection (i.e. limiting use to those most likely
to benefit and avoiding ‘treatment creep’ in cases 
where inappropriate patients may be offered 
therapy).
Garber et al. (2014) flag issues that can be inherent
in carrying out the necessary post-marketing
surveillance required for CED: studies were found to 
have design flaws, insufficient funding, and 
insufficiently sound scientific data collection to 
formulate sound coverage policy.
Rome et al. (2014) suggest that the US legal system 
unfairly pre-empts manufacturers of high-risk
devices from damages claims from patients in the
event of their failure, reemphasising the importance 
of clinician and patient engagement in well-designed 
post-marketing surveillance and comparative 
effectiveness research.
In 2014, out of a list of 618 qualifying
products/procedures, 114 received ‘Nu-B’ clearance 
status for negotiation of reimbursement with 
Germany’s providers of statutory health insurance, 
however the outcomes of these being adopted into 
the G-DRG system are not clear.
What is the evidence?
Implantable cardiopace defibrillators (ICDs) are cited by Garber et al.
(2014) as an effective example of CED expanding patient access to 
treatments for secondary prevention of sudden cardiac death.
However, Rome et al. (2014) raise a number of concerns around the US
pre-marketing authorisation processes, to warn clinicians of the issues 
relevant to adopting high-risk cardiovascular devices as part of post-
marketing evaluation studies. 
Methods of CED vary considerably among countries, though the
International Society For Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research 
(IPSOR) task force has attempted to begin a process of harmonisation by
introducing best practices in ‘performance-based risk-sharing
arrangements’, and by providing examples of different countries’
approaches and their relative successes (Garrison et al. 2013).
Applicability to the UK
In the UK, NICE has two designations for extending coverage based on
further evidence generation
•		 ‘Only in Research (OIR)’ – recommending treatments only to be used 
in the context of randomised trials or studies
•		 ‘Only with Research (OWR)’ – recommending further research 
alongside use
Longworth et al. (2013) found that the majority of OIR/OWR
recommendations were for technologies considered to be cost ineffective 
and noted that the use of OIR/OWR recommendations has been
decreasing over time.
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Risk sharing: Performance-based 
reimbursement
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
Performance-based reimbursement (PBR) is a payer–manufacturer arrangement by which the performance of the medical
technology is tracked in a defined patient population over a defined period of time and the reimbursement is based on the health
outcomes achieved in the defined patient population (Garrison et al. 2013). 
Because reimbursement is contingent on real-world performance, the approval of innovative medical technologies is not held back
until satisfactory trial-based evidence is available, thereby accelerating adoption (Garrison et al. 2013; Carlson et al. 2011).
International examples
One recent example is the relatively new class of oral antidiabetic medications dipeptidyl peptidase-4(DPP4) 
inhibitors. In the first round of negotiation the French pricing committee (PC) was willing to offer only a small premium 
over alternative drugs for dual therapy: same efficacy for glycemic control as prior drugs and longer efficacy to lower 
haemoglobin A1C, which was supported only by experimental data. In a second round of negotiation the PC agreed to 
let the manufacturers conduct a large real-world study to demonstrate their claim of longer efficacy to lower 
haemoglobin A1C in exchange for a higher price. The condition agreed was that the payer would receive a 
retrospective pay back on all sales corresponding to the difference between the agreed-upon price and the initial price,
if the study did not support the manufacturers’ claim. The final results of the study are not yet available in the literature.
A similar agreement was made for glitazones, another antidiabetic drug. Manufacturers also claimed that this drug
would delay escalation of insulin therapy. In this case, the real-word study did not support the claim and the prices 
were adjusted downwards.
A third example refers to a controlled-release form of risperidone for treatment of patients with schizophrenia. The PC
concluded that the clinical efficacy of the new drug was similar to that of conventional treatments and granted a rating
which led to a price similar to existing medications. The manufacturer argued for a higher rating (and higher price), 
claiming that the controlled release form would lead to fewer hospital admissions. The PC agreed on a higher price
under the condition that the post-launch study would have to demonstrate fewer hospital admissions. The study
supported the manufacturer’s claim.
30
  
        
           
            
   
     
           
         
         
      
   
              
      
      
              
 
 
Risk sharing: Performance-based 
reimbursement
International examples (contd.)
In Italy, innovative and expensive medicines are usually assessed by PBR schemes, termed conditional
reimbursement schemes, linking the use of the medicine to the clinical outcomes obtained. These include: 
•		 ‘Cost sharing’: price reduction for initial cycles of treatment until it is clear that patients are responding followed by
full price afterwards.
• ‘Payment by results’: payer receives a payback for non-responders.
• ‘Risk sharing’: only 50 % of the costs of the non-responders is paid back by the manufacturer. 
•		 Pivotal to the Italian PBRs are the drug-monitoring online registries, which are developed by the Italian Medicines 
Agency (AIFA). These registries collect patient-level data on drug safety and effectiveness in real world conditions.
For example, the Cancer Drugs Register covers all the prescription centres, with a total of more than 100,000 
oncology patients.
•		 One example of a registry created for a new drug is the case of aliskiren (Rasilez) used in the treatment of
hypertension. Two years of observational data showed that aliskiren reduced both systolic blood pressure and 
diastolic blood pressure in patients enrolled and that it had a good safety profile. Several decisions were taken
based on the data collected in the registry, including a price reduction of aliskiren to align the price to that of other
hypertensive medicines.
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Risk sharing: Performance-based 
reimbursement
Strengths and weaknesses
PBR schemes may accelerate the adoption of new medicines because 
they give patients access to novel and potentially beneficial medical
technologies despite uncertainty about their cost-effectiveness. The
alternative would be to delay the reimbursement approval until satisfactory
evidence on cost-effectiveness is available.
PBR schemes also have the societal benefit of changing the structure of
incentives for manufacturers towards one that explicitly rewards health 
outcomes for patients.
Operationalisation requires a clear definition of many key parameters 
upfront, namely, health outcome measures of interest, target patient
population, period of time for data collection, methods to collect evidence,
how to monitor data collection, who is responsible for data collection, and 
penalties in case of noncompliance with agreement/contract (e.g. failure in 
collecting the data as agreed or delays in collecting the data).
Enforceability of the contract might be difficult, particularly when some of
the key parameters above are not clearly defined upfront.
Retrospective claims on reimbursements may be challenging to ensure. In 
the case of the UK, Williamson (2010) finds that response-based payback
schemes pose significant challenges about tracking patients and thereby
ensuring claims for reimbursements for non-responders.
Additional evidence of good quality can be challenging to obtain: reliable 
data on clinical effectiveness in the real world are heavily dependent on
the study and research design, patients groups selected, etc.
What is the evidence?
The evidence on effectiveness of PBR is schemes s very
limited. In a review to assess the effectiveness of PBR 
schemes, Puig-Peiró et al. (2011) found that more than 40% of
the papers assessing effectiveness of PBR focus on the case of
the UK multiple sclerosis drug risk-sharing scheme, which is
considered by many as highly unsuccessful.
The Italian PBR schemes appear to have been successful in
speeding adoption of innovative medicines. This may have
been due in part to the use of a national electronic patient 
registration system, which is considered to reduce 
substantially the costs of collecting real-world data and ensure
a good level of quality of the data collected (Garrison et al. 
2013).
Applicability to the UK
The UK has what are known as ‘Patient Access Schemes’
(PASs), which are agreement-specific arrangements. These
include a few PBR cases. The best documented ones are the
bortezomib (Velcade) agreement and the UK multiple sclerosis
drug risk-sharing scheme (Pickin et al. 2009; Raftery 2010). 
The experience with PBR in the UK and elsewhere suggests
that the success of PBR schemes is heavily dependent upon
how appropriate, hands-on, and enforceable the design of the
scheme is, in particular in the scheme’s consideration of:
•		 Outcome measures by which the success of the scheme
will be assessed
•		 Appropriate evidence collection
•		 How to implement, govern and report the results
32
      
        
           
            
         
  
 
 
              
      
          
         
          
             
        
            
          
     
     
        
           
           
 
 
  
Process linkage: Stakeholder 
engagement
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
Stakeholder engagement involves stakeholders at different parts of the pathway communicating and collaborating. This helps to 
align the expectations and priorities of stakeholders along the pathway to reduce duplication of effort. Engagement can be
introduced at all stages of the adoption pathway, and can be used either to accelerate the development of specific drugs, devices or 
diagnostics that appear to provide a clear clinical impact, or to determine new systems and processes aimed at accelerating and 
improving adoption.
International examples
The FDA has been involved with early engagement in a number of projects: e.g. developing a regulatory pathway for 
the development of drugs for cognitive impairment associated with schizophrenia (CIAS) in collaboration with 
academia and industry, and the Critical Path Institute, born out of the FDA’s Critical Path Initiative, U.S., which 
provides neutral ground where FDA scientists, industry and academic partners can work together.
MaRS Excellence in Clinical Innovation Technology Evaluation (EXCITE) The results used to obtain licensing and 
regulatory approval for health technologies may not be sufficient to prove the value of technology to the health system,
and to get the health system to buy in and adopt it. EXCITE connects health technology innovators with experienced
researchers to enable them to get the evidence and data needed to show the value of their product. EXCITE facilitates 
discussions with health system stakeholders to determine what is required for successful adoption of their product.
Biosciences Accelerator at The Hamner Institutes for Health Sciences, U.S. The Biosciences Accelerator 
connects emerging companies with access to a state–of–the-art research facility as well as scientific and business 
development support to assist them in commercialisation. The Hamner Institutes have links with industry, academia 
and government, allowing for shared resources. One project involves accelerating drug development in China, under
US regulatory standards, with the aim of bringing the product to the worldwide market.
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Process linkage: Stakeholder 
engagement
International examples (contd.)
New Drug Development Paradigms (NEWDIGS), U.S. There is awareness that new development drug paradigms 
will be required for the regulation and adoption of innovative medicines. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) has set up the New Drug Development ParadIGmS (NEWDIGS) program as a collaborative international ‘think
and do’ tank focused on enhancing the capacity of the global biomedical innovation system to reliably and sustainably
deliver new, better, affordable therapeutics to the right patients faster. NEWDIGS takes a systems engineering
approach to designing, evaluating and catalysing important advancements that are so complex and cross-cutting that
they cannot be addressed by a single organization or market sector. It brings together international pharmaceutical
companies, regulators, academia, payers and other relevant stakeholders in a safe haven setting to work on innovative 
drug development systems. Its first project, started in 2010 and finished in 2014, focused on the concept of adaptive 
licensing and how it could be put into practice. The EMA has now launched an adaptive licensing pilot.
The Italian Horizon Scanning Project This is an early warning system for identifying and assessing the potential
clinical and economic impact of emerging technologies can help decision-makers make decisions and plan
appropriately. The Italian Horizon Scanning Project collects data on emerging technologies, prioritises them, and 
produces reports 36, 18 and 12 months before the EMA will pass judgement, giving data on development plans and 
clinical and economic impact. These data are used by the Italian national health service to identify useful research
areas which may be interesting to them but not to pharmaceutical companies, to plan and optimise the most 
appropriate use of resources, and to help decide upon the appropriate level of reimbursement. 
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Process linkage: Stakeholder 
engagement
Strengths and weaknesses
Stakeholder engagement and collaboration
can create an environment which is more 
efficient at converting discovery into 
therapeutics that benefit human health and 
are adopted by the health system.
Transparency and clarity of process for 
obtaining regulation helps companies 
ensure they have obtained the necessary
evidence before applying for regulation;
this can reduce delays and accelerate 
adoption.
Stakeholder engagement can encourage 
collaboration among small to medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and academia, giving
SMEs access to expertise that will help 
them generate the evidence needed for 
regulation and adoption more efficiently.
The ability to carry out stakeholder
engagement is a function of the resources 
of all parties involved.
Stakeholders on both sides need to be
willing to engage.
Stakeholder engagement may require 
stakeholders to align their priorities and 
work together. 
What is the evidence?
There is widespread agreement among our interviewees that improving
transparency and clarity of process for obtaining regulation will accelerate 
adoption.
Because these schemes are new, there are no evaluations yet; therefore, we have 
not found evidence of their effectiveness.
However, stakeholder engagement schemes are increasing in number, and 
NEWDIGS is growing in size, indicating that people believe they will give results.
Applicability to the UK
Stakeholder engagement is being introduced to the UK via a variety of schemes. 
From September 2013 there has been a new National Institute for Health 
Research (NIHR) scheme, Diagnostics Evidence Co-operatives, aimed at 
connecting device companies with experts in health economics, human factors,
clinical trials and other skills required to generate the evidence they need to get to 
market. These centres are aim at being one-stop shops with the infrastructure to 
streamline innovations into clinical practice. There are currently no similar UK
schemes for devices or drugs. 
The EMA was already involved in NEWDIGS; as of November 2014, NICE also 
became involved.
Interviewees reported that whilst there is a system for drug horizon scanning in the
UK (UK PharmaScan), there is a disconnect between this system and budget 
holders, so that it is not used effectively. They reported that the Scottish Medicines 
Consortium, which also uses UK PharmaScan and other sources, makes better 
use of this information; we have not found any wider evidence to support this. 
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Process linkage: Human 
factors approach
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
Human factors refers to the idea that adoption of a medical product, in particular medical devices, will depend not just on its 
availability but also on its ease of use, the burden the product puts on patients or doctors, and perceived fears. A well-designed 
product that can be used easily and correctly is more likely to have good uptake. 
International examples
The FDA has incorporated human factor testing into regulatory approval. The main motivation for doing this is to 
improve safety, by reducing the risk that a device will be misused. 
Similarly, the EMA has also introduced requirements for device manufacturers to establish and follow a Usability
Engineering Process within the EU’s Medical Device Directive.
In Canada there is a Healthcare Human Factors team within Toronto General Hospital that researches human factors 
and helps companies prepare for FDA human factor testing.
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Process linkage: Human 
factors approach
Strengths and weaknesses
Introducing human factor testing increases the burden, in terms of
time and cost, on both the company and the regulator. This could 
increase the time it takes for a product to be designed and go 
through regulation. However, once on the market, a more 
appropriate and user-friendly product is more likely to be adopted.
Appropriately designed products are less likely to be used 
incorrectly or inappropriately; they therefore should be safer.
Human factor approaches can also be applied to guideline design 
and to wider aspects of the health system.
Human factor approaches require an extra set of skills that many
companies may not currently contain. Stakeholder engagement
could help SMEs obtain access to these skills.
Regulating bodies also need human factor skill sets to be able to 
carry out the appropriate testing.
The testing carried out needs to be chosen appropriately, so that
the product is tailored to the individuals who would be using it.
While policy interventions may encourage a human factors 
approach to the development of medical innovations, it will
ultimately be the responsibility of the manufacturer to ensure that
products developed are suitably designed. 
What is the evidence?
Innovation literature identifies cultural factors as being
important for adoption.
From our interviews and literature search, we have not
found evidence that they speed up adoption.
However, we have found examples of bad design causing
a lack of adoption of technologies.
Applicability to the UK
The new NIHR Diagnostic Evidence Cooperatives set up
in part to enable SMEs to access all of the expertise 
required to get their product licensed and on the market,
include human factor specialists.
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Pricing: Wider cost-
effectiveness measures
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
Wider cost-effectiveness measures (WCEM) broaden the notion of value by considering such factors as severity of disease and 
wider societal factors (e.g. productivity gains, costs savings to other services), along with health gains for individual patients derived
from extension and/or improvement of quality of life.
It may speed up adoption to the extent in which it gives a premium to ‘valuable’ factors that would otherwise be ignored. Without the
consideration of a wider set of ‘valuable’ factors, many medicines may have an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio above the
maximum cost per QALY at which the medicine is deemed cost effective, and thereby fail to be recommended for adoption by
appraisal bodies (Claxton et al. 2008).
International examples
Sweden was an early adopter of WCEM (starting in 2002) as part of their value-based pricing (VBP) scheme. Sweden
is the international example that comes closer to the WCEM approach suggested for the UK (as part of the VBP
consultation) in terms of breadth of potential ‘value’ factors (Sussex et al. 2013). Manufacturers propose a price which 
is compared against an adjusted threshold that takes into account a breath of ‘value’ factors such as:
• Cost savings in healthcare 
•		 Cost savings in any other sectors/budgets, e.g. savings for other publicly funded services, cost savings to patients,
relatives and carers
• Value of lost production
•		 Greater willingness to pay for benefits in case of diseases with more severe consequences and diseases for which 
few or no treatments are available
Australia provides an example of a country where reimbursement is primarily based on clinical and cost effectiveness 
for patients measured by QALYs, but it also takes into account a few additional elements of ‘value’, namely:
• Innovativeness of the medicine (premium of approximately a 30% margin on costs)
• Prescription volumes
• Level of activity undertaken by the company in Australia (including new investment, production and R&D)
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Pricing: Wider cost-
effectiveness measures
International examples (contd.)
Italy represents an example of a country that incorporates several elements of ‘value’ in determining the
reimbursement price of medicines, by using a score system (as opposed to a monetary value) to value the several
factors and negotiation to convert ‘value’ into a price (as opposed to comparing manufacturer price with a 
threshold). The ‘value’ of a medicine depends on:
•		 Clinical effectiveness, measured by surrogate clinical endpoints (as opposed to QALYs) and leading to three scored 
categories 
• Availability of therapeutic alternatives, classified in three scored categories
• Severity of the disease, classified in three scored categories
• Degree of innovativeness of the product, classified in two scored categories
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Pricing: Wider cost-
effectiveness measures
Strengths and weaknesses
WCEM more closely align therapy priorities with the value
the public gives to such therapies.
In the long run, prices based on value to patients and the
wider society give signals about priority areas so that 
research efforts can be directed to areas were breakthrough 
medicines are in need.
An adjusted cost-effectiveness threshold that provides more 
health than is displaced is key. Setting the threshold too high
will lead to medicines being reimbursed at prices that 
‘displace too much health elsewhere in the health-care 
system’. Setting the threshold too low may mean society will
not benefit from medicines that would have improved net 
health (Claxton et al. 2008).
WCEM can be used in conjunction with ex-post-review
mechanisms, e.g. coverage with evidence development. The
only country where there is evidence of WCEM (Sweden)
combines WCEM with CED, and this combination is seen as
pivotal to speed up adoption. 
Operationalisation requires a clear set of rules. WCEM 
requires the prior definition of what ‘value’ criteria to include, 
how to measure each criterion, how to aggregate the value
of the several criteria and how to convert the aggregated
value into the maximum reimbursement.
In a fixed budget, it reprioritises treatments delivered, 
because one would need to recalculate all previous
therapies against WCEM. There will be winners and losers
in terms of approved therapies.
What is the evidence?
Evidence from Sweden summarised by Persson (2012) suggests that WCEM
schemes may be well placed to reward, encourage and speed up the adoption
of innovative medicines. 
This is particularly true for orphan drugs. Orphan drugs often fail to obtain 
reimbursement because their high cost-per-QALY ratios usually exceed the
accepted threshold. In Sweden, from June 2003 to April 2010, TLV received 30
requests for orphan drugs reimbursements and awarded reimbursements to 29. 
However, as pointed by Persson (2012), the fact that Sweden used CED 
schemes in conjunction with WCEM played an important role in this high rate of
approval of orphan drugs.
Applicability to the UK
Much of what is needed to operationalise WCEM for medicines in the UK is
already being used by NICE in assessing health technologies. Currently NICE
looks only at NHS costs, although it has been suggested that this should be 
extended beyond just NHS costs (e.g. carers’ costs, changes in employment)
(Raftery, 2013). The existing process would need to be strengthened to form a 
suitable vehicle for price negotiation. The UK has defined a broad set of ‘value’
criteria as part of the VBP public consultation conducted in 2010, which, by and 
large, have already been taken into account by NICE. However, the
international examples of RCE approaches show that only a limited subset of
these have been implemented in practice.
This would require the clear definition of:
• What ‘value’ factors to consider alongside with health gains for patients (as captures in QALY) 
• How to measure and value the benefits and costs associated with each ‘value’ factor
• How to aggregate the value of the several factors
• How to convert the overall measure of value into the maximum price the NHS would reimburse
• The challenge of assessing all current treatments against the new standard
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Pricing: Special pricing 
agreements
What is it? How does it speed up adoption?
In addition to outcome-based managed entry agreements, such as performance-based reimbursement and coverage with evidence
schemes, financial agreements also exist to address the uncertainty and high prices commonly associated with new medical
innovations.
These can include price–-volume agreements (PVAs), which define a threshold of expenditure, or dose/time capping schemes, 
which applies a cap to expenditure, linked to either time or dosage, after which the manufacturer would pay any additional costs.
Some countries have also used their market power, price sharing and taxation to negotiate lower prices for medical innovations. 
International examples
In 2003, Australia launched its first non-outcome-based agreement, and by 2013, 71 medicines were designated with 
special pricing agreements. For example Australia pursues expenditure caps for certain drugs, such as etanercept for 
rheumatoid arthritis, where authorities agreed to cover AUS$100 million a year and the manufacturer picks up any
additional costs (Walker et al. 2012)
In France, the cost of Sovaldi, a Hep C drug, was negotiated down by 27% (from $71,100 to $51,400 per 12-week
regimen). This was achieved through sharing price information with 13 other European countries, and selectively
taxing drug makers when the total cost of their medicines exceeded a certain amount each year. While France got the
cheapest price, other European countries (including the UK) also benefited from the lower prices.
The Italian national health system has adopted several special pricing agreements including discounts, price-volume 
agreements and ‘AIFA notes’ – which limit reimbursement of the relevant drugs to population subgroups. Underpinning
many of these interventions is a sophisticated drug monitoring registries system, which aim to generate data to ensure 
the appropriate use of drugs. It is also important to note that of the 78 therapeutic indications that have special pricing
agreements, 28 also have performance-based reimbursement strategies linked to them.
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Pricing: Special pricing 
agreements
Strengths and weaknesses
In combination with performance-based mechanisms,
these interventions have the potential to address budget 
impact and use, access and cost-effectiveness 
assessments – ultimately helping to speed up adoption.
Special pricing agreements offer flexibility in assessing
new medical innovations, allowing uncertainty and costs 
to be reduced. 
Research shows that the majority of special pricing
agreements are for cancer and auto-immunity drugs.
Pricing arrangements also allow the pricing to reflect the
production costs because standard prices for every
dose provide a small return in the short-term and then a 
higher return in the long term. 
Pure financial agreements often fail to take into account
health outcomes, and many of these mechanisms 
should be integrated into wider efforts to generate 
evidence on effectiveness.
A proliferation of special pricing agreements may result
in manufacturers submitting higher unit costs for new
medical innovations, through anticipating potential cost 
reductions.
A lack of transparency on many of these pricing
agreements makes it difficult to generate cross-country
findings.
What is the evidence?
Evidence sources for the effectiveness of these interventions in 
speeding up the adoption of new medical innovations remains limited.
According to Ferrario and Kanavos (2015) ‘there has been no
published evidence comparing the different approaches used by
countries to improve access and no comparison of governance
structures around MEAs with the aim of explaining their
implementation’.
In addition, the confidential nature of many of these pricing
agreements means that the evidence base for evaluations across 
countries is low.
Applicability to the UK
The UK pursues a number of different pricing agreements. For
example, capping schemes exist in the UK – such as Lenalidomibe, a 
drug for multiple myeloma, where the manufacturer pays for the cost 
of the drug if more than 26 cycles are needed. Discounts are also 
applied to certain drugs, such as Sunitinib for the treatment of renal
cell carcinoma, which is provided for free for the first cycle. 
Due to relatively free pricing policies, price negotiations may not be
applicable to the UK. It is important to note, however, that price
negotiations are often a lengthy process and that time limits for pricing
and reimbursement decisions, as set by the EU Transparency
Directive, are regularly exceeded by Member States.
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Enabling factors 
Many of these interventions are underpinned by a series of enabling factors in addition to the need for a conducive policy
context and interventions which aim to stimulate initial innovation. While these factors are not interventions, they were 
identified by a number of interviewees as important elements in accelerating the adoption of medical innovations. 
Policy interventions can be used to tackle different aspects of innovation, and they occur at various stages of the
innovation pathway, from the interventions to stimulate R&D through to development, approval, implementation and
diffusion of innovations in healthcare. Prior to obtaining proof-of-concept, an evaluation of which is outside the scope of
this study, the right environment is needed to stimulate R&D and develop medical innovations. While supply-side
incentives have traditionally formed the basis for the majority of policies to encourage innovation, innovative demand-side
policies, such as innovation prizes and innovative procurement, may incentivise further medical innovation (Love &
Hubbard 2009).
To support the interventions discussed above, we outline three enabling factors in the health system that are useful:
Data Clinical trial Clinicalinfrastructureinfrastructure culture
• Electronic health records • Patient recruitment, • Variations in • TeleHealth retention prescribing practices• Data linkage • Spillover effects 
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Clinical trial infrastructure
Having affordable and accessible clinical trial infrastructure, underpinned by a system that 

supports high recruitment into clinical trials and ensures transparent and efficient approval processes, 

is crucial to accelerated access to new medical innovations.
Patient recruitment can account for 50–-60% of a clinical trial timeline and up to one-third of a trial’s costs, so interventions 
that improve recruitment are crucial (Europe Economics, 2012). 
A number of studies have also shown that the adoption of new medical innovations is increased in situations where 
clinicians are closer (whether geographically or socially) to where the clinical trials took place. 
Europe Economics (2012) note that ‘not only is there an information spillover effect, but the skills to administer new
treatments are more likely to be in place if physicians have been involved in the development process’.
Policy interventions into clinical trials have a direct impact on the
adoption times of new medical innovations. Lambers Heerspinck et
al. (2008) suggest that ‘the introduction of the European Union
Clinical Trials Directive appears not to shorten the duration of
regulatory procedures within Europe [and that] the duration of
regulatory approval procedures is shorter in the U.S. compared with
Europe’.
A recent Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry (ABPI)
paper also noted that ‘around 80% of clinical trials do not meet
patient recruitment timelines, and on average last 30-42% longer
than companies initially plan for’ (ABPI 2014).
Some have noted that the UK could consider moving towards a
centralised trialling system which may improve recruitment rates and
reduce the costs of clinical trials. However, more centralised
systems may result in fewer and less varied trials (Europe
Economics 2012).
Others suggest that advances in technologies, such as social media,
e-health and data monitoring may help to improve recruitment,
retention and engagement of patients in clinical trials (Shah 2013).
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Data infrastructure
Many of the interventions outlined above rely on the ability to ensure that new medical innovations 

continue to be safe and effective post-launch, which requires robust, effective data systems. 

A well-managed data system that can capitalise on the benefits of electronic health records (EHR), 

home-monitoring and/or telemedicine devices can allow for better monitoring and evidence assessments to take place
	
throughout the adoption pathway, thus ensuring accelerated adoption of drugs, devices or diagnostics.
	
There are a number of challenges with implementing comprehensive data systems. According to our interviewees, the UK 

is considered to have good data systems but linkage among databases is limited.
	
A systematic review of barriers to the acceptance of EHR found eight major Doctors with Electronic Health Records and Multifunctional Health IT
Capacitycategories, namely: financial; technical; time; psychological; social; legal;
92%
69%
56%
82%
68%
60%
33%
27%
10%
7%
97%organizational and change process (Boonstra & Broekhuis, 2010). 100% 98%
	
Nordic countries have particularly comprehensive health registers, which 90%
	
collect data on risk factors and health and health outcomes, and which can
	
be linked to other registries and events in both the past and the future. 80%
	
One interviewee noted that the ‘UK struggles to connect data on drugs in 70%
	
the pipeline with healthcare priorities’. A recent ABPI (2014) study also
	
noted that ‘Other countries have more comprehensive and complete 60%
	
anonymised medical data available for healthcare research than the UK’
	
(ABPI 2014). 50%
	
In relation to EHRs, a recent US study showed the UK to be performing well 40%
	
compared with other countries: 97% of primary care doctors were using
	
EHRs, of which 68% were multifunctional. The multifunctionality of EHRs is 30%
	
important because it can allow for the generation of patient information,
	 20% 
such as lists of patients’ medications; generation of patient registry and
panel information, such as lists of patients due for preventive care; order 10% 
entry management, such as electronic prescribing; and decision support,
such as alerts about potential adverse drug interactions. 0% 
UK AUS NETH USA CAN GER 
Using EHRs with Multifunctional Capacity 
Source: Porter (2013) Adoption of Electronic Health Records in the United States
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Clinical culture
Finally, a conducive environment for approved drugs to be taken up and diffused throughout a country
is an important enabler in the later stages of adoption.
In the UK, once drugs, devices & diagnostics obtain market authorisation and are issued under NICE guidance, 
there is still variation in adoption and diffusion.
A number of interviewees noted that the culture of prescribers in the UK can be quite conservative, thus slowing down the
adoption of new innovations. Efforts to engage clinicians in research were seen as a key to improving adoption rates.
While drug usage can vary considerably both among countries and across different regions within a country, ‘it is important 
to recognise that there is uncertainty about the optimum level of drug usage in different disease areas and the extent to
which high or low usage point to inappropriate use’ (Nolte & Corbett 2014).
Adoption rates of selected drugs relative to issuing of NICE guidance
Source: NESTA (2014) Which doctors take up promising ideas?
Lublóy’s (2014) systematic review of factors affecting medicine 
uptake highlights both:
–		 Prescriber-level factors: doctors’ scientific orientation, 
prescribing habits, exposure to pharmaceutical marketing,
and interpersonal communication.
–		 Patient-level factors: doctors with younger patients, 
patients with higher socioeconomic statuses, and/or patients 
with poorer health statuses were more inclined to prescribe 
new drugs early.
A recent Nesta study (Stokes et al. 2014) on the early adoption 
of promising new ideas in primary care stressed the importance 
of local intermediaries such as Academic Health Science 
Networks and Clinical Commissioning Groups, in accelerating 
adoption.
The study found that GPs ranked availability of evidence and 
platforms for engagement with other clinicians to discuss 
new innovations highly as key factors in enabling the adoption 
of new innovations at their practice.
There are many more studies on the uptake of medicines than 
on medical technologies/diagnostics.
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Interventions can be 
combined 
As noted above, the interventions we identified were split 
into four conceptual groups, as each example has different
repercussions on the stakeholders in the health system. 
However, many of these interventions often occur in 
parallel and are not mutually exclusive. Here we briefly
discuss:
• Interventions that are combined for a specific disease 
– Ebola 
• Interventions that are combined under one concept 
– Value based pricing 
– Adaptive Pathways pilot 
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Interventions can be combined  
for specific diseases: 
Lessons from Ebola
The recent Ebola outbreak in West Africa highlights how some
of the interventions discussed above have been used to
accelerate the adoption of medicines for a particular disease. 
The proposed interventions are discussed below: 
Process improvement
•		 In the US TKM-Ebola, an experimental drug treatment developed by 
Tekmira, was granted ‘Fast-track’ status (FDA) to expedite its 
approval. 
•		 In the EU, the EMA has encouraged developers of Ebola 
treatments/vaccines to apply for ‘Orphan Drug’ designation (EMA 
2014). This designation ensures that further resources are provided 
by the EMA, including free scientific advice, fee waivers and 10 years 
of market exclusivity post-authorisation. 
Risk sharing
•		 As previously noted, the ‘Animal Rule’ will also be used by the FDA 
as an instrument that will be applied in an eventual approval of 
treatments against Ebola. TKM-Ebola is currently being developed 
under the ‘Animal Rule’. 
•		 The FDA’s Expanded Access protocol to allow compassionate use 
of drugs pre-market approval has also been applied to TKM-Ebola. 
Process linkage
•		 The EMA has also encouraged developers to apply in parallel to both 
the FDA and the EMA. Both organisations are working closely on 
sharing information, helping to spread resources and avoid 
duplication across countries. 
•		 Orphan designation also encourages early engagement among 
regulators and developers. 
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Interventions can be combined under one concept:
Value-based pricing 
Value based pricing (VBP) at its essence is a method of
setting up prices of medicines based on perceived benefits to
the patients and the wider society (Persson et al. 2010).
Conceptually this combines both performance-based
reimbursement strategies (risk-sharing) and a widening of
cost-effectiveness measures (pricing). 
Countries that use VBP also tend to employ review
mechanisms, such as coverage with evidence development 
(CED), to ensure that decisions taken initially under great 
uncertainty remain valid.
VBP creates a set of incentives affecting the behaviour of
both pharmaceuticals and the NHS (or its international 
counterparts), ultimately affecting the adoption pace of new
medicines. By considering wider benefits along with clinical 
effectiveness, VBP affects the behaviour of pharmaceutical 
companies with respect to R&D, pricing and launching
strategies.
As previously noted, evidence from Sweden suggests that a
VBP scheme may be well placed to speed up the adoption of
innovative medicines when used in conjunction with CED 
schemes (Persson 2012). 
PBR schemes are used with WCEM as part of Italy’s VBP
approach. In particular, registers have been set up ‘to monitor 
prescribing against licensed indications as well as monitor 
their therapeutic value in practice to guide future 
management and reimbursed prices’ (Adamski et al. 2010).
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Interventions can be combined under one concept:
The EMA’s Adaptive Pathways pilot
The adaptive pathways approach (formerly known as ‘adaptive licensing’) is part of the European Medicines Agency’s efforts 
to improve timely access for patients to new medicines. 
The concept builds on the idea of adaptive licensing which is defined as follows:
The Adaptive licensing is a prospectively planned, flexible approach to regulation of drugs and biologics. Through 
iterative phases of evidence gathering to reduce uncertainties followed by regulatory evaluation and license
adaptation, AL seeks to maximize the positive impact of new drugs on public health by balancing timely access for 
patients with the need to assess and to provide adequate evolving information on benefits and harms so that better-
informed patient care decisions can be made. (Eichler et al. 2014)
More recently, the concept has been expanded to the An example of how MAPPs could work in practice
	
Medicines Adaptive Pathways to Patients (MAPPs)
	
approach. In addition to regulatory aspects of access, 

this now also includes post-market authorisation
	
decisionmaking and appropriate use in clinical practice.
	
The proposed pilots combine:
	
•		 Risk-sharing – through combining early access, 
non-standard authorisation and coverage with 
evidence schemes. 
•		 Process linkage – through early engagement 
with key stakeholders such as regulators, payers 
and industry. 
Source: Schulthess, et al. (2014). Medicine adaptive pathways to patients (MAPPs):
using regulatory innovation to defeat Eroom’s law
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opportunities of transferring these examples into the UK health system.
Methodology
Theoretical and conceptual review. The first phase of this study focused on understanding the theoretical foundations 
that underpin the adoption of innovative medicines and medical technologies. This initial stage was used to develop 
interview protocols and search terms for the subsequent phases of the research.
Identification of examples. We conducted 20 key informant interviews with a range of stakeholders, including industry, 
academia and practitioners, to collect their suggestions of different international examples of processes that have
accelerated the adoption of innovative medicines and medical technologies and to examine the barriers to and
Evidence mapping. Focusing on 
suggestions from the previous stage, and
covering the three areas of interest (drugs, 
devices and diagnostics), we reviewed
various academic, grey literature and
policy sources to assess the current 
evidence and international experience
around a given topic. The evidence
gathered in this stage was used to validate
and triangulate findings from the key
informant interviews. 
Synthesis and classification. Based on
the evidence collated we developed a set 
of case studies for the 11 interventions 
identified. 
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